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ON-THE-JOB SEARCH IN A MATCHING MODEL WITH
HETEROGENEOUS JOBS AND WORKERS*
Juan J. Dolado, Marcel Jansen and Juan F. Jimeno
This article examines the effects of transitory skill mismatch in a matching model with hetero-
geneous jobs and workers. In our model, some highly-educated workers may accept unskilled jobs for
which they are over-qualified but are allowed to engage in on-the-job search in pursuit of a better job.
We show that this feature has relevant implications for the set of potential equilibria, the un-
employment rates of the different types of workers, the degree of wage inequality, and the response
of the labour market to shifts in the demand and supply of skills.
An examination to select 175 postal workers for the region of Madrid
yesterday gathered 15,570 candidates. Among them, 53% were college
graduates (licenciados or diplomados) while the required educational
attainment was upper secondary education (graduado escolar) or an
equivalent level of vocational training.
(EL PAI´S, 23rd March, 2002).
As the excerpt from a Spanish newspaper illustrates, mismatch between the skill
requirements of jobs and the educational attainments of workers can be a pervasive
feature in some labour markets. In this article, we study this phenomenon in a
matching model with heterogeneous jobs (skilled and unskilled) on one side and
heterogeneous workers (highly and less educated) on the other side of the market.
Since the matching technology is imperfect, the highly educated workers may end up
in unskilled jobs for which they are over qualified. A key element in our analysis is that
mismatched workers are allowed to keep the option of moving to better jobs through
on the job search (henceforth, OTJ search). Skill mismatch has therefore a transitory
nature in our economy leading to job to job (hereafter, JTJ) transitions which are shown
to have relevant implications for the composition of jobs, unemployment, wages and
the reaction of the labour market to shifts in the demand and supply of skills.
Labour economists have long recognised the importance of JTJ flows but it is only
recently that the literature on equilibrium unemployment has started to explore its
implications systematically.1 Our article contributes to this stream of research by
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providing an analytical framework in which to identify the channels through which
over qualification and OTJ search affect labour market outcomes. In particular, given
long standing concerns about the possibility that over qualified workers may crowd out
low educated workers from unskilled jobs (see, e.g., Freeman, 1976; OECD, 2001), we
pay specific attention to the effects of these phenomena on the less skilled segment of
the labour market.
The starting point of our analysis is the matching model proposed by Albrecht and
Vroman (2002) (henceforth, AV) who explore the consequences of skill mismatch in a
setup similar to ours but where OTJ search is precluded. Like AV, we assume that firms
have a choice between two types of jobs. The skilled jobs are more productive than the
unskilled jobs but they require a highly educated worker, while the unskilled jobs can be
performed equally well by all workers.2 In the absence of OTJ search, AV show that there
could be two types of equilibria: one in which highly educated workers match with both
types of jobs (a cross skill matching equilibrium) and another in which they refuse to take
unskilled jobs (an ex post segmentation equilibrium). The latter type is more likely:
(i ) the larger is the gap between the productivity of skilled and unskilled jobs and
(ii) the higher is the share of highly educated workers in the population.
Their findings suggest that shifts in the skill distribution and in the relative productivity
of jobs may cause abrupt changes in unemployment rates and wages as the economy
moves between the two equilibria; see also Acemoglu (1999).
Aside from creating a more realistic model, our main goal is to analyse how the above
predictions change when the option of OTJ search is taken into account. To keep the
model tractable, we assume that this search is a costless activity for the workers. None
theless, the highly educated workers who meet an unskilled job may face an opportunity
cost, since the arrival rate of future job offers drops when the match is accepted. In
particular, we assume that the ratio between the arrival rates of offers to employed and
unemployed job seekers takes a value between 0 and 1. In this fashion, our model nests
both AV’s setup (a zero arrival rate for employed job seekers) and the case in which all
job seekers face equal contact rates. The remaining assumptions are borrowed from
AV, including a random matching technology and the assumption that workers obtain
a fixed share of the flow surplus of a match.3 This last assumption implies that the
pursuit of a better match is the only motive for OTJ search in our economy, ruling out
the possibility of wage differentials between identical workers on the same type of jobs.
We obtain three main results that affect AV’s conclusions. Our first result shows that
the introduction of OTJ search reduces the scope for multiple equilibria since it
lowers the opportunity cost of mismatch for the highly educated workers. In fact, for a
sufficiently small gap in the above mentioned arrival rates, there is a unique type of
equilibrium with cross skill matching and OTJ search. This result rules out the
drastic response to demand and supply shifts that characterises skill mismatch models
without OTJ search.
Our second result shows that transitory skill mismatch by over qualified workers is
more harmful to the prospects of less educated workers than permanent mismatch.
2 For simplicity, workers skills are assumed to be perfectly correlated with their educational attaintments.
3 For more details on the role of this assumption, see Section 2.3.
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Here there are two channels at work. On the one hand, the introduction of OTJ search
stimulates the creation of skilled jobs since the assumption that mismatched workers
stay in the pool of job seekers facilitates filling these jobs. On the other hand, the quits
by over qualified workers reduce the stability of unskilled jobs, lowering the profitability
of firms offering these jobs These effects result in a shift of the job distribution towards
skilled jobs which, in line with the empirical evidence, induces both a fall in the job
finding rate of the less educated workers and a relatively high separation rate for
unskilled jobs.
Third, we show that OTJ search widens the wage differences among the highly
educated workers. As mentioned above, it reduces their opportunity cost of accepting
unskilled jobs but, in return, they may suffer a pay cut. In fact, when the gap between
the arrival rate of job offers for employed and unemployed job seekers is not too large,
we show that mismatched workers receive a lower wage than less educated workers. This
result differs sharply from the one holding without OTJ search, where over qualified
workers get paid a higher wage, since they need to sacrifice all their outside options.
Our simulations suggest that the above effects may have important implications for
the overall degree of wage inequality. For plausible parameter values we find that the
total variance of the wage distribution is much larger than when JTJ transitions are
ignored. Moreover, a significant fraction of this additional wage dispersion is due to
wage differentials among highly educated workers. Thus, it seems worthwhile exploring
whether an increase in the frequency of JTJ transitions may have contributed to the
widening of the within education and within occupation wage dispersions that is
observed notably in the US but also in many other OECD countries since the 1980s;
see, e.g., Katz and Autor (1999). Moreover, our results suggest that the introduction of
JTJ transitions between different jobs or occupations may help to improve the poor
performance of standard search and matching models in replicating the observed
variability of wages; see Hornstein et al. (2006).
Finally, we briefly outline the connections with two related studies which also address
the issue of OTJ search. Pissarides (1994) proposes the same wage setting mechanism we
use here but in a model with homogeneous workers and heterogeneous jobs. By
assuming that match productivity is growing over time (due to learning by doing), he is
able to construct a model in which JTJ transitions only take place at short job tenures.
Workers can therefore get locked into bad jobs. We ignore these tenure effects on
search intensity to focus on the case where OTJ search depends on match quality and
the educational attainment of the worker. In accordance with the empirical evidence
(see Section 1), this generates a model in which quits are more prominent among over
qualified workers and affect the labour market position of the less educated workers. By
considering a homogeneous pool of workers, these aspects are absent in Pissarides
analysis. Closer in spirit to our work is Gautier (2002). He uses essentially the same setup
for production as we do. However, by construction, wages in his model are independent
of the aggregate labour market outcomes. This simplifies the analysis considerably but it
leaves out many interesting issues such as the relationship between the frequency of JTJ
transitions and the degree of wage inequality that are addressed in our article.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 1 reports some empirical
evidence to motivate the analysis. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 describes the
potential set of equilibria while Section 4 shows that the introduction of OTJ search
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enhances the likelihood of having a unique cross skill matching equilibrium. Section 5
examines the comparative statics of the model in response to demand and supply shifts
for the special case of equal contact rates. Section 6 presents some numerical results on
the effect of these changes in a calibrated economy with realistic parameter values.
Finally, Section 7 concludes. Proofs of the main Propositions are gathered in the
Appendix.
1. A Brief Look at the Evidence on JTJ Flows
Recent evidence suggests that JTJ transitions are an important element of the total
labour market turnover. For example, Fallick and Fleischman (2001) report that, in
the US labour market, more than four million workers changed employer during an
average month in the 1990s, about the same number as the workers who left the
labour force from employment and more than twice the number who moved from
employment to unemployment. Further, the total separation rate falls with age and is
negatively correlated with the educational attainment of workers but in relative terms
the JTJ transitions account for a much larger share of total separations for college
workers (50%) than for high school dropouts (30%). Similar evidence has been
provided by Nagypa´l (2003) who reports that around 55% of the total separations of
workers with a college degree are due to JTJ flows, whereas that proportion falls to
34% for workers without a high school degree. Moreover, about 70% of the highly
educated workers who undertake a JTJ transition do so for job related reasons as
opposed to personal quits, layoffs or end of contract whereas that fraction is below
60% for less educated workers. Although the categorisation of quits versus layoffs
could be questioned since it relies on the subjective self report of the worker the
above evidence seems to point out that JTJ flows are a key feature in explaining
separations and that OTJ search is more prevalent among highly educated workers.
Similar findings hold for Europe. For example, JTJ flows in the UK accounted for at
least 40% of all separations in the 1980s; see Pissarides (1994). Elsewhere in Europe
these flows appear to be less frequent but in relative terms the turnover pattern is
similar to that in the US. For example, Bachman (2006) estimates that JTJ transitions
represented on average around 35% of the monthly separation flows in Germany
during 1980 2000 and that this proportion reaches 52% among highly educated
workers. In line with these findings, Theodossiu and Zangadelis (2007) report cross
country evidence on JTJ transitions during the 1990s for six of the main EU economies.
Although their estimates are likely to be upward biased relative to those quoted before
due to their lower frequency the estimates are based on year to year turnover rates in
the eight available waves (1994 2001) of the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP) they report that JTJ transitions account for between 40% to 55% of total
separations in the different EU countries. Moreover, from a logit regression on the
determinants of JTJ transitions, they also find that the probability of engaging in these
transitions increases with workers educational attainment.
Finally, since the focus of our study is on JTJ transitions by over qualified workers, it
is interesting to report some recent evidence provided by Eurostat (2003) about the
gap in percentage points (p.p.) between the shares of workers who declare to be
performing OTJ search in two groups of college graduates:
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(i ) those who declare to be over qualified for their current jobs, and
(ii) those who declare to be appropriately matched.4
These differentials are reported for a number of EU countries and range from 1.5 p.p.
in Denmark and Finland to about 7 8 p.p. in Italy, Portugal and Spain. Thus, this
evidence seemingly confirms that the pursuit of a better job is a relevant determinant of
OTJ search among highly educated workers who feel over qualified.
2. The Model
This Section introduces our matching model with heterogeneous agents and OTJ
search. Time is continuous and we restrict attention to steady states.
2.1. Main Assumptions
The economy is populated by a continuum of heterogeneous workers with measure
normalised to one and a large continuum of identical firms. All agents are risk neutral
and infinitely lived and discount the future at the common rate r.
Production of the unique final good requires a job and a worker. We use the index
j 2 fh, lg to distinguish the two types of workers in our economy: highly educated (h)
and less educated (l ) workers. The fraction of less educated workers in the population
of workers is denoted by l 2 (0,1) which is assumed to be exogenously determined in
our model. Likewise, there are two types of jobs that can be either filled or vacant. They
are indexed by i 2 fs, ng and it is assumed that each firm can have at most one job. An
unskilled job (n) can be filled by either type of worker and produces a constant flow of
y(n) units of output. Thus, the productivity of these jobs does not depend on the type
of worker. By contrast, skilled jobs (s) can only be filled by highly educated workers,
whose productivity in these jobs, y(s), is larger than y(n). In sum, match productivity is
as follows:
Our assumptions imply that highly educated workers are more productive than less
educated workers when they manage to find a skilled job. However, in a market subject
to search frictions, highly educated workers may find it optimal to accept both types of
jobs in equilibrium. When this occurs, using AV’s terminology, we say that the equi
librium exhibits cross skill matching. Conversely, when they refuse unskilled jobs, the
equilibrium exhibits ex post segmentation.
Match Productivity
Workers/Jobs Unskilled Skilled
l-type y(n) 0
h-type y(n) y(s)(>y(n))
4 The data come from an ad hoc module carried out by Eurostat in the 2000 EU Labour Force Survey
designed to collect specific information on the transition from the education system to working life in EU
countries.
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Finally, in our economy, the turnover of workers is partly endogenous. A match may
be dissolved when:
(i ) the worker decides to quit because a better job has been located, or
(ii) the job is destroyed by a shock.
This second source of turnover is exogenous and follows a Poisson process with arrival
rate d. The unemployed workers receive a flow payoff b from home production and
leisure that satisfies the restriction that b < y(n), while the firms with a vacant job incur
a flow cost c until the job is filled. Since we assume free entry, firms will exhaust the
rents from job creation in equilibrium.
2.2. Matching
Job seekers andfirmswith vacant jobs arematched together in pairs through an imperfect
matching technology. Like AV, we assume that the matching process is undirected. How
ever, by contrast, we allow for OTJ search by mismatched workers, while they only allow
for job search during unemployment. A mismatched worker can therefore move to a
better job without an intervening spell of unemployment. Below we show that this feature
reduces the opportunity cost of mismatch for highly educated workers.
The total flow of random contacts between a job seeker and a firm is determined by a
standard CRS meeting function:
m½vðnÞ þ vðsÞ;uðlÞ þ uðhÞ þ keðn; hÞ;
where u( j ) is the mass of unemployed workers of type j, v(i ) is the mass of vacancies of
type i, and e(n, h) is the mass of mismatched workers whose relative search intensity is
captured by the parameter k 2 [0,1].5 The case where k ¼ 0 replicates AV’s setup while
k ¼ 1 corresponds to the case in which the arrival rate of job offers is independent of
the employment status of the job seeker. Finally, we assume that m[.,.] is strictly
increasing in both arguments and we define the effective labour market tightness by
h ¼ [v(n) þ v(s)]/[u(l ) þ u(h) þ ke(n, h)]. Accordingly, we can write the contact rate
of a firm as p(h) ¼ m(1, 1/h), while the contact rate of a job seeker is equal to f(h) ¼
hp(h) during unemployment and kf(h)  f(h) during employment. The properties of
m[.,.] guarantee that p0(h) < 0, f 0(h) > 0 and we assume that lim h!0 p(h) ¼
limh!1 f(h) ¼ 1 and limh!1 p(h) ¼ limh!0 f(h) ¼ 0.
2.3. Wage Determination
As mentioned earlier, our analysis focuses on one important aspect of OTJ search,
namely the pursuit of a better match. However, since the work of Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) it is well known that workers may use OTJ search to obtain a higher
wage in the same type of job. This observation has stimulated a lot of research on the
impact of OTJ search on the process of wage determination. For example, Postel Vinay
5 The restriction to the unit interval is natural. It implies that mismatch tends to have a cost because
employed workers have a (weakly) lower contact rate than unemployed workers. In fact, in a model with
endogeneous search effort, the workers would never choose a value for k > 1 if the search costs during
employment are at least as high as during unemployment.
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and Robin (2002) and Cahuc et al. (2006) consider extensions of the Burdett
Mortensen model in which employers are allowed to match the offer of a rival
employer. In both instances, workers can exploit the outside offers from rival
employers to obtain a pay rise in their current jobs. Alternatively, Shimer (2006)
reconsiders the arguments of Burdett and Mortensen in a standard matching model
with OTJ search and bilateral bargaining. He shows that the standard surplus sharing
rule may not be optimal in this environment because firms may find it profitable to pay
a higher wage in order to reduce the probability of a quit.
Allowing for these features would complicate our model greatly. Hence, to avoid these
complications, we follow Pissarides (1994) in adopting two strong simplifying assump
tions regarding wage determination. The first one is that wages are set according to a
linear surplus splitting rule that entitles workers to a fraction b 2 (0,1) of the flow rents,
whereas the second one is that the wage can be revised continuously at no cost, so that
long term contracts are ruled out. Thus, even if an employed worker could start nego
tiations with a new employer before resigning from the current job, this would not affect
the equilibrium outcome. The new employer would immediately renegotiate the wage
once the worker breaks the relationship with the previous employer.6
These assumptions lead to a wage setting rule that looks identical to the typical Nash
bargaining solution in models without OTJ search. Formally, let U( j ) denote the value
of unemployment for a worker of type j and V(i ) the value of a vacant job of type i.
Similarly, let J(i, j ) and W(i, j ) denote the proceeds for the firm and the worker from a
match that combines a job of type i and a worker of type j. In any match with a positive
match surplus S(i, j )  W(i, j ) þ J(i, j ) V(i ) U( j ), the constant wage w(i, j ) then
satisfies the following sharing rule:
ð1 bÞ½W ði; jÞ U ð jÞ ¼ b½ J ði; jÞ V ðiÞ: ð1Þ
Condition (1) rules out any wage differences among identical workers in the same
type of job. Finally, in the rest of the analysis we assume that the mismatched workers
only quit when they find a better paid skilled job.7
2.4. Asset Values
We are now in a position to define the asset value equations of workers and firms.
Let f ¼ v(n)/[v(n) þ v(s)] denote the share of unskilled vacancies. Then the asset
value of a highly educated worker during unemployment, U(h), satisfies:
rU ðhÞ ¼ b þ f ðhÞ fmax W ðn; hÞ U ðhÞ; 0½  þ ð1 fÞ W ðs; hÞ U ðhÞ½ f g: ð2Þ
6 Notice that our assumptions also eliminate the scope for equilibria with matching wage offers. For
example, firms with unskilled jobs could try to match the rival offers from firms with skilled jobs if
w(s, h) < y(n). However, the mismatched workers will reject these matching offers. They realise that the
employer will renegotiate the wage back to its initial level once the worker has declined the rival offer. Thus,
in equilibrium the mismatched workers will always accept rival offers from firms with skilled jobs as long as
w(s, h) > w(n, h). Below we will show that this condition always holds in our model.
7 Alternatively, we could have assumed that workers incur an infinitesimally small cost e ’ 0 when they
switch employer. In this setting, the mismatched workers would strictly prefer to remain with their current
employer if they meet another firm with an unskilled job. Moreover, the same assumption would eliminate
the theoretical possibility of OTJ search by appropriately matched workers.
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The highly educated job seeker will accept an unskilled job if this improves her lifetime
income. The associated payoff in this case, denoted as W(n, h), is given by:
rW ðn; hÞ ¼ wðn; hÞ þ d½U ðhÞ W ðn; hÞ þ kf ðhÞð1 fÞ½W ðs; hÞ W ðn; hÞ; ð3Þ
where the last term on the right hand side of (3) corresponds to the expected gain
from successful OTJ search, which depends on the search intensity parameter k.
The rest of the asset value equations of workers are standard (Pissarides, 2000):
rU ðlÞ ¼ b þ f ðhÞf½W ðn; lÞ U ðlÞ ð4Þ
rW ðn; lÞ ¼ wðn; lÞ þ d½U ðlÞ W ðn; lÞ ð5Þ
rW ðs; hÞ ¼ wðs; hÞ þ d½U ðhÞ W ðs; hÞ: ð6Þ
Next, to define the asset value equations of vacant jobs, we denote the share of
unemployed job seekers by w ¼ [u(l ) þ u(h)]/[u(l ) þ u(h) þ ke(n, h)]. Similarly, we
let / ¼ u(l )/[u(l ) þ u(h)] denote the share of less educated workers in the pool of
unemployed. Accordingly, we can write the asset value equation for an unskilled va
cancy, V(n), as:
rV ðnÞ ¼ c þ wpðhÞ /½ J ðn; lÞ V ðnÞ þ ð1 /Þmax½ J ðn; hÞ V ðnÞ; 0f g; ð7Þ
while the corresponding expression for a skilled vacancy, V(s), satisfies:
rV ðsÞ ¼ c þ ð1 w/ÞpðhÞ½ J ðs; hÞ V ðsÞ: ð8Þ
Finally, the asset values of filled jobs verify:
rJ ðs; hÞ ¼ yðsÞ wðs; hÞ þ d½V ðsÞ J ðs; hÞ ð9Þ
rJ ðn; lÞ ¼ yðnÞ wðn; lÞ þ d½V ðnÞ J ðn; lÞ ð10Þ
rJ ðn; hÞ ¼ yðnÞ wðn; hÞ þ dþ kf ðhÞð1 fÞ½ ½V ðnÞ J ðn; hÞ: ð11Þ
The fact that the separation rate in (11) is larger than d just reflects that mis
matched workers will leave their employer when they find a skilled job. In the next
Sections, we will analyse how this feature affects the decisions of firms and workers
in equilibrium.
3. Equilibria
In this Section we proceed to define the set of equilibria. Since we are primarily
interested in the equilibria with cross skill matching and OTJ search, we shall initially
assume that the surplus of filling an unskilled job with a highly educated worker is non
negative, namely S(n, h)  0. The alternative case of ex post segmentation, where
S(n, h) < 0, will be discussed at the end of this Section.
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It is useful to start with the derivation of the equilibrium surplus expressions. From
(5), (10) and the free entry condition for unskilled jobs, V(n) ¼ 0, it follows that S(n, l )
satisfies:
ðr þ dÞSðn; lÞ ¼ yðnÞ rU ðlÞ: ð12Þ
Together with (1), this implies that the wage of less educated workers, w(n, l ), is
given by:
wðn; lÞ ¼ rU ðlÞ þ b½yðnÞ rU ðlÞ: ð13Þ
Likewise, regarding highly educated workers in skilled jobs, the corresponding
expressions are:
ðr þ dÞSðs; hÞ ¼ yðsÞ rU ðhÞ ð14Þ
wðs; hÞ ¼ rU ðhÞ þ b½yðsÞ rU ðhÞ; ð15Þ
where we have used (1), (6), (9) plus the free entry condition for skilled jobs, V(s) ¼ 0.
The above solutions for the appropriately matched workers are standard, while we
obtain the following less conventional solutions for over qualified workers:8
½r þ dþ kf ðhÞð1 fÞSðn; hÞ ¼ yðnÞ rU ðhÞ þ f ðhÞkð1 fÞbSðs; hÞ; ð16Þ
wðn; hÞ ¼ rU ðhÞ þ b½yðnÞ rU ðhÞ f ðhÞkð1 fÞbð1 bÞSðs; hÞ: ð17Þ
Comparison of (16) with (12) reveals two important differences. First, the output
generated by a mismatched worker is discounted at a higher rate than the output of a
less educated worker. Second, the value of S(n, h) includes the expected gains from OTJ
search which amount to f(h)kb(1 f)S(s, h). Since the actual gains from OTJ search
will accrue to the worker and not to the firm, mismatched workers compensate their
employers by accepting a wage reduction given by f(h)k(1 f)b(1 b)S(s, h).
Next, to obtain the reservation values of the two types of workers, we rewrite (2) and
(4) as:
rU ðlÞ ¼ b þ f ðhÞfbSðn; lÞ ð18Þ
rU ðhÞ ¼ b þ f ðhÞb fSðn; hÞ þ ð1 fÞSðs; hÞ½ : ð19Þ
Using (12), (14) and (16) this yields the following expressions:
rU ðlÞ ¼ ðr þ dÞb þ f ðhÞbfyðnÞ
r þ dþ f ðhÞbf ð20Þ
rU ðhÞ ¼ ðr þ dÞa1b þ f ðhÞb fðr þ dÞyðnÞ þ ð1 fÞa2yðsÞ½ 
a2a3 þ ðr þ dÞf ðhÞbfð1 kÞ ; ð21Þ
8 As mentioned earlier, since OTJ search is costless, we only have to analyse the matching decisions of the
highly-educated workers.
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where a1 ¼ r þ d þ f(h)k(1 f), a2 ¼ r þ d þ f(h)k(1 f þ bf) and a3 ¼ r þ d þ
f(h)(1 f)b are discount factors.
Finally, inserting the previous expressions for S(i, j ) and rU( j ) plus the wage rule (1)
into both (7) and (8), we can write the two zero profit conditions V(n) ¼ 0 and V(s) ¼ 0,
respectively, as:
c
ð1 bÞpðhÞw ¼
/½yðnÞ b
r þ dþ f ðhÞfbþ
ð1 /Þfa3½yðnÞ b f ðhÞbð1 kÞð1 fÞ½yðsÞ bg
a2a3 þ ðr þ dÞf ðhÞbfð1 kÞ ;
ð22Þ
c
ð1 bÞpðhÞð1 w/Þ ¼
a1½yðsÞ b þ f ðhÞbf½yðsÞ yðnÞ
a2a3 þ ðr þ dÞf ðhÞbfð1 kÞ : ð23Þ
Equations (22) and (23) constitute the first two equilibrium relationships of the model.
The remaining ones arise from the steady state flow conditions for u(l ), u(h) and
e(n, h). Denoting the total mass of unemployed workers by u  u(h) þ u(l ), we can
express these conditions as follows:
ff ðhÞ/u ¼ dðl /uÞ ð24Þ
f ðhÞð1 /Þu ¼ d½1 l ð1 /Þu ð25Þ
ff ðhÞð1 /Þu ¼ ½dþ f ðhÞkð1 fÞeðn; hÞ: ð26Þ
All together, these five conditions lead to the following definition of a cross skill
matching equilibrium when OTJ search is present:
Definition 1. A steady state equilibrium with cross skill matching and OTJ search consists of
a set of value functions for W(i, j ), J(i, j ), V(i ), U( j ) and S(i, j ) that satisfy (2) (11), (12),
(14) and (16) plus a vector fu, h, /, f, wg such that
(1) All matches produce a non negative surplus for the equilibrium values of fh, fg.
(2) The vector fu, h, /, f, wg solves the free entry conditions (22) and (23) plus the steady
state conditions (24) to (26).
Our last task in this Section is to describe the necessary conditions that define an
equilibrium with ex post segmentation. As mentioned earlier, this type of equilibrium
arises in AV’s model (k ¼ 0) when highly educated workers make up a relatively large
share of the population and/or when the productivity gap between jobs is relatively
large. In the next Section, we show that these conditions still hold in our model with
OTJ search when k is relatively small but positive.
Formally, when highly educated workers refuse to work in unskilled jobs (S(n,
h) < 0), the solution for rU(h) in (21) reduces to:
rU ðhÞ ¼ ðr þ dÞb þ f ðhÞð1 fÞbyðsÞ
r þ dþ f ðhÞð1 fÞb ;
while the solution for rU(l ) still satisfies (20). Replacing these solutions in (12) and
(14), we find that:
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Sðn; lÞ ¼ yðnÞ b
r þ dþ f ðhÞfb ; Sðs; hÞ ¼
yðsÞ b
r þ dþ f ðhÞð1 fÞb :
As a result, an ex post segmentation equilibrium can be defined as follows:
Definition 2. A steady state equilibrium with ex post segmentation can be summarised by a
vector fh, /, f, ug that generates an asset value for highly educated workers rU(h) > y(n) and
solves the following four equilibrium conditions:
c
ð1 bÞpðhÞ ¼
/½yðnÞ b
r þ dþ f ðhÞbf ð27Þ
c
ð1 bÞpðhÞ ¼
ð1 /Þ½yðsÞ b
r þ dþ f ðhÞbð1 fÞ ð28Þ
f ðhÞf/u ¼ dðl /uÞ ð29Þ
f ðhÞð1 fÞð1 /Þu ¼ d½1 l ð1 /Þu: ð30Þ
Obviously, JTJ transitions are precluded in this segregated equilibrium since the mass
of mismatched workers is equal to zero.
4. Equilibrium Configurations
In this Section we provide a complete characterisation of the possible equilibrium
configurations. Our goal is to prove that the introduction of OTJ search (0 < k  1)
enhances the likelihood of having an equilibrium with cross skill matching. To do so,
it is useful to recall that the existence of this equilibrium is guaranteed under two
conditions:
(i ) firms must be willing to provide both types of jobs and
(ii) the highly educated workers must be willing to accept employment in unskilled
jobs.
To guarantee condition (i ), it is sufficient to rule out the corner solution in which
firms exclusively offer unskilled jobs. The following result shows that this requirement
places a lower bound on the share of highly educated workers and on the productivity
differential between skilled and unskilled jobs:
Proposition 1. A sufficient condition for firms to offer both skilled and unskilled jobs is that
yðsÞ yðnÞ
yðnÞ b >
lðr þ dÞ
ð1 lÞ½r þ dþ f ðhÞb ð31Þ
where h is the labour market tightness associated with a single job type distribution.
Proof. See Appendix.
Next, in order to guarantee condition (ii), we need to ensure that highly educated
workers and firms with unskilled jobs are willing to match, i.e., S(n, h) > 0. In the
Appendix we show that this leads to the following condition:
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Proposition 2. A necessary condition for a cross skill matching equilibrium to exist is that,
yðsÞ yðnÞ
yðnÞ b <
r þ dþ f ðhÞbk
f ðhÞbð1 kÞð1 fÞ ð32Þ
for the equilibrium values of h and f in this type of equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
In general, condition (32) can only be verified a fortiori once the equilibrium values
of h and f have been determined. However, there is an exception. Since the right hand
side of (32) approaches infinity as k tends to 1, the above inequality is always verified in
an economy where employed and unemployed job seekers face equal contact rates, i.e.,
k ¼ 1. Hence, the following result holds:
Corollary 1. With the same search intensity for all job seekers (k ¼ 1), there always exists a
cross matching equilibrium when condition (31) is satisfied.
To gain some intuition for this benchmark result, it is useful to consider the
expression for S(n, h) that is obtained after replacing U(h) in (16) by (19):
Sðn; hÞ ¼ yðnÞ ½b þ f ðhÞð1 kÞð1 fÞbSðs; hÞ
r þ dþ f ðhÞ½kð1 fþ bf : ð33Þ
From the numerator of (33) it follows that S(n, h) > 0 when y(n) is larger than the
bracketed term which measures the opportunity cost of a highly educated worker
accepting an unskilled job. When OTJ search is ruled out (k ¼ 0), this opportunity cost
is simply the expected income of a highly educated worker under ex post segmentation.
The effect of allowing for OTJ search is to reduce this opportunity cost. In fact, when
k ¼ 1, the only component of the opportunity cost is b since mismatched and unem
ployed job seekers face the same contact rates. Given our assumption that y(n) > b, this
immediately implies that S(n, h) is positive.
Proposition 2 provided the necessary condition for the existence of a cross skill
matching equilibrium when firms offer both types of jobs. The next Proposition goes
one step further by providing a sufficient condition in terms of k that rules out ex post
segmentation. The proof is again based on the idea that a rise in k lowers the oppor
tunity cost of mismatch for highly educated workers:
Proposition 3. For any economy that satisfies (31) there exists a value k 2 ð0; 1Þ such that
the equilibrium always exhibits cross skill matching for any k 2 ðk; 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
The threshold value k is defined the lowest value of k at which a highly educated
worker and a firm with an unskilled job can deviate from an ex post segmentation
equilibrium without incurring a loss. Thus, the equilibrium always exhibits cross skill
matching for k > k.
Notice, however, that the above argument does not rule out the existence of a
cross skill matching equilibrium at lower values than k. By definition, an individual
  12
firm worker pair will incur a loss if they deviate from an ex post segmentation equilib
rium for any k < k. Yet, if all highly educated workers were to collectively start to accept
unskilled jobs, firms would react by increasing the proportion of unskilled jobs in the
economy. This shift in the job distribution would make skilled jobs more scarce and,
hence, for the same value of k, all highly educated workers may now find it optimal to
accept unskilled jobs. Thus, for some intermediate values of k the equilibrium may
exhibit either cross skill matching or ex post segmentation. For future purposes, we
denote the lower bound of this interval as k so that multiple equilibria are possible in
the range ½k; k.
Finally, using similar arguments, it is easy to prove that the introduction of OTJ
search never leads to the destruction of a cross skill matching equilibrium:
Proposition 4. Consider an economy that generates a cross skill matching equilibrium when
k ¼ 0. The same economy will have a cross skill matching equilibrium with OTJ search for any
k > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Summing up, the results in Propositions (1) to (4) imply that OTJ search unam
biguously narrows the scope for equilibria with ex post segmentation, leading to the
following two alternative equilibrium configurations:
1 The economy always exhibits cross skill matching.
2 The economy exhibits cross skill matching for any k > k and ex post segmenta
tion for k < k, while it may exhibit both types of equilibria for the intermediate
range of values k 2 ½k; k.
Finally, from the discussion in the Appendix, it becomes clear that the values of the
above mentioned thresholds k and k depend positively on the share of skilled jobs,
1 f, and on the value of S(s, h). Hence, in line with AV, we find that the likelihood of
having an ex post segmentation equilibrium increases both with the productivity gap
between skilled and unskilled jobs and the share of highly educated workers.
5. Equal Contact Rates
Our previous analysis has shown that the introduction of OTJ search tends to narrow
the set of equilibria. The aim of this Section is to show that it also has interesting
implications for the distribution of wages and the response of the economy to shocks.
To illustrate these effects, we restrict the analysis to an economy with equal contact
rates (k ¼ 1), though our previous arguments imply that the results below also hold for
values of k sufficiently close to unity (see Section 6.3).
5.1. Wages
Our first objective is to show that the introduction of OTJ search raises the degree of
wage inequality in the economy. To derive the distribution of wages in an economy with
k ¼ 1, it is useful to start from the following Lemma:
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Lemma 1. In any economy with equal contact rates that satisfies (31), 0 < S(n, h) < S(n, l ).
Proof. See Appendix.
The insight for this result (see (A.14) in the Appendix) is that mismatched workers
produce the same increment in output as less educatedworkers do, namely, y(n) b. Yet,
for the former, this flow surplus is discounted at a higher rate due to the possibility of a
quit. Hence, in principle, firms would prefer to hire a more stable less educated worker.
Given our surplus sharing rule, the mismatched workers therefore have to accept a lower
wage than the less educated workers, as shown in the next result:
Proposition 5. In any economy with equal contact rates that satisfies (31),
w(n, h) < w(n, l ) < w(s, h).
Proof. See Appendix.
The above result differs sharply from the one obtained with k ¼ 0. In the latter case, the
over qualified workers receive a higher wage than the less educated workers since they
have to sacrifice their entire reservation wage, rU(h), when they accept an unskilled job.
When k ¼ 1, by contrast, mismatched workers only need to receive compensation for
rU(h) f(h)(1 f)bS(s, h) ¼ b þ f(h)fbS(n, h). From (18), this value is smaller than
rU(l ) implying that mismatched workers receive a lower wage than the less educated
workers. Thus, the fact that OTJ search reduces the opportunity cost of mismatched
workers also shows up in the bargained wages. This interesting source of within group
wage inequality is ignored in conventional matching models. Furthermore, for future
purposes, it is important to notice that w(n, h) does not depend directly on y(s). Below we
show that this feature has important implications for the response of the labourmarket to
shifts in the relative productivity of skilled jobs. However, before examining these com
parative statics results, we need to establish the conditions that guarantee uniqueness of
the equilibrium.
5.2. Uniqueness
To obtain a set of conditions that rule out the possibility of multiple cross skill
matching equilibria, we solve the flow conditions (24) to (26) for u, f and w in terms of
h and /. Substituting the resulting expressions into the two free entry conditions (22)
and (23) yields a system of two equations in two unknowns where conditions for
uniqueness can be derived.
The only complication is that we have three types of job seekers. In effect, from the
perspective of firms, a change in the value of h induces two effects: a standard congestion
effect, as p 0(h) < 0, and a novel composition effect, as the fraction of unemployed less
educated workers in the mass of job seekers, w, tends to fall with higher values of h.
Thus, a priori it is unclear how a change in h affects the matching rate of skilled jobs,
(1 /w)p(h). From the perspective of highly educated workers, a similar ambiguity
arises since f 0(h) > 0 and the share of skilled jobs, 1 f, falls for higher values of h.
Nonetheless, for relatively large values of l, it can be shown that these composition
effects are small compared to the changes in f(h) and p(h).
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Using this feature we are able to show that the equilibrium is unique if:
(i ) l is at least 0.5, so that o[p(h)(1 hw)]/oh < 0 and o[f(h)(1 f)]/oh > 0,9
(ii) workers obtain at least half the surplus of any match (b  0.5), and
(iii) the productivity differential between skilled and unskilled jobs, y(s) y(n), is
sufficiently large (see Appendix for details).
The unique equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1. The free entry locus of unskilled
jobs, V(n) ¼ 0, is upward sloping since firms with unskilled jobs prefer to hire less
educated workers. Thus, a rise in tightness, h, needs to be compensated by a rise in the
proportion of less educated workers in the total mass of unemployed, /. Conversely,
the free entry locus for skilled jobs, V(s) ¼ 0, is downward sloping because these jobs
can only be performed by highly educated workers so that a lower value of / (a larger
fraction of unemployed highly educated workers) is needed when h increases. There
fore, both loci can cross at most once.
5.3. Responses to Shifts in Demand and Supply of Skills
As shown above, the pool of job seekers contains a mass of mismatched workers who
temporarily accept a job below their qualifications in return for a lower wage than
equally productive less educated workers. In this Section we show how this feature alters
the response of the labour market to a rise in the productivity of skilled jobs and/or the
share of highly educated workers. Following the existing literature, we refer to these
changes as skill biased technological change (SBTC) and skill upgrading (SU), respectively,
and throughout the analysis we assume that the conditions for uniqueness hold.
5.3.1. Skill biased technological change
The effects of SBTC are illustrated in Figure 2. The increase in y(s) raises the profits of
skilled jobs while the profits of unskilled jobs are unaffected because y(s) drops out of
(22) when k ¼ 1. Hence, the main effect of SBTC is an increase in the mass of skilled
vacancies, v(s). As a result, the V(s) ¼ 0 locus shifts upwards along the V(n) ¼ 0 locus,
leading to a rise of h and /.
The increase in h reduces the unemployment rate of highly educated workers
labelled by ~uðhÞð¼ uðhÞ=ð1 lÞ ¼ d=½dþ f ðhÞÞ while we cannot draw definite con
clusions about the unemployment rate of less educated workers denoted as
~uðlÞð¼ uðlÞ=l ¼ d=½dþ ff ðhÞÞ. The reason is that the rise in v(s) causes a fall in the
share of unskilled vacancies, f. These results can be summarised as follows:
Proposition 6. In the unique cross skill matching equilibrium with k ¼ 1, SBTC increases
h and /, and reduces ~uðhÞ, while its effect on ~uðlÞ is ambiguous.
Once more, this comparative statics result differs from the one derived by AV. In
effect, for the case of cross skill matching, they show that SBTC raises ~uðlÞ while it has
no effect on ~uðhÞ. Hence, the JTJ flows of highly educated workers increase (reduce)
9 In our numerical simulations we confirm that the sign restrictions for the derivatives always hold for any
l  0.5.
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the sensitivity of ~uðhÞð~uðlÞ) to changes in y (s).10 The stronger response of ~uðhÞ is due to
the fact that skilled jobs can attract both unemployed and employed job seekers. The
supply of these jobs is therefore more elastic when k ¼ 1 than when k ¼ 0. Yet, at the
φ
φ
θ θ
V(n) = 0
V(s) = 0
1
1
Fig. 1. The Unique Cross skill Matching Equilibrium
φ
φ
φ
θ θ θ
V(s) = 0
V(n) = 0
2
1
1 2
Fig. 2. The Effects of Skill biased Technological Change
10 This result is unrelated to our assumption of a common value for b and c. In particular, we would obtain
the same result if the unemployment income of highly-educated workers and the flow cost of skilled vacancies
were indexed to y(s). In our model, technological change is only neutral when y(s), y(n), b and c all grow at
the same rate. A shock to the relative productivity of workers can therefore move the equilibrium to a
different balanced growth rate in which the unemployment rate of highly-educated workers is permanently
lower than before.
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same time, the JTJ flows also insulate the profits of unskilled jobs from the effects of
SBTC because w(n, h) and V(n) do not directly depend on y(s). Thus, under cross skill
matching the drop in unskilled vacancies turns out to be smaller than in a model
without JTJ transitions. Moreover, as explained before, the JTJ transitions prevent a
possible shift to ex post segmentation that may be accompanied by a rise in the
unemployment rates of both types of workers as shown in AV (see Section 7.2 for a
numerical example).
5.3.2. Skill upgrading
An increase in the share of highly educated workers leads to a similar shift in the
relative demand for workers as SBTC, because a rise in (1 l) makes it easier for firms
to fill a skilled job. In this case, however, it is a priori ambiguous how the unemployment
rate of highly educated workers will respond since it depends on the relative size of the
shifts in the demand and the supply of these workers.
The ambiguous response of the labour market to SU is illustrated in Figure 3. The
reduction in l shifts downwards both free entry loci. Hence, we obtain a fall in /,
whereas h, and therefore ~uðhÞ and ~uðhÞ, may go up or down. In sum:
Proposition 7. In a unique cross skill matching equilibrium with k ¼ 1, SU increases /
while its effects on h, ~uðlÞ and ~uðhÞ are ambiguous.
Despite the ambiguity, it is evident that a shift in the skill distribution should provoke
a stronger reaction of labour demand in our economy than in an economy without OTJ
search since mismatched workers do not drop out of the pool of job seekers. Given AV’s
finding that oh/ol ¼ 0 under cross skill matching this suggests that SU may actually
lead to a fall in the unemployment rate of the highly educated workers. In the next
Section we present some simulations in which this is indeed the case.
φ
φ
φ
θ θ θ
V(s) = 0
1 2
2
1
V(n) = 0
Fig. 3. The Effects of Skill upgrading
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6. Numerical Solutions
In this Section we report the results of some illustrative numerical simulations. Our aim
is to gauge the quantitative importance of the JTJ flows and their impact on the
distribution of jobs, wages and employment for different values of k. Furthermore, at
the end of this Section, we discuss to what extent the model is able to explain some of
the stylised facts regarding unemployment, wage inequality and JTJ flows in Europe
and the US.
6.1. The Benchmark Economy
Following Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), we assume a standard Cobb Douglas
meeting function with an elasticity of 0.5, i.e. f ðhÞ ¼ hp . Time is measured in quarters
and the rest of the parameter values are given by b ¼ 0.5, r ¼ 0.01, c ¼ 0.5, d ¼ 0.1,
b ¼ 0.1, y(s) ¼ 1.5, l ¼ 0.75, plus a normalised value y(n) ¼ 1. This parameter
configuration is similar to the one used by AV.
The first column of Table 1 presents the labour market outcomes for our benchmark
economy with OTJ search and k ¼ 1 while, for comparative purposes, the second
column reports results for k ¼ 0. For the chosen parameters unique cross skill
matching equilibria are obtained in both instances. The first difference to highlight is
that the proportion of skilled jobs, 1 f, is much higher with OTJ search (33%) than
without OTJ (11%). This is so since firms are more willing to open skilled jobs in an
economy where mismatched workers remain in the pool of job seekers. Consequently,
Table 1
Labour Market Outcomes in the Benchmark Model
Variables
With OTJ search Without OTJ search
(k ¼ 1) (k ¼ 0)
Labour market tightness h 1.486 1.528
Share of unskilled vacancies f 0.671 0.891
Share of less-educated unemployed / 0.812 0.770
Share of unemployed job seekers w 0.765 1
Unemployment rate u 0.101 0.081
Mass of mismatched workers e(n, h) 0.031 0.206
Unemployment rate highly-educated
workers ~uðhÞ
0.076 0.075
Unemployment rate less-educated
workers ~uðlÞ
0.109 0.083
Wage of less-educated workers w(n, l) 0.905 0.920
Wage of highly-educated workers
in unskilled jobs w(n, h)
0.750 0.955
Wage of highly-educated worker in
skilled job w(s, h)
1.323 1.210
JTJ total separations 0.349 0
Wage Inequality
between groups 1.378 1.065
Within groups 1.662 1.026
Variance of Wages
Total 0.032 0.002
Highly-educated workers 0.038 0.006
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transitory mismatch yields a higher unemployment rate of less educated workers
(10.9%) than permanent mismatch (8.3%). At the equilibrium value of h with k ¼ 1
(k ¼ 0), a less educated worker exits unemployment at a rate ff(h) ¼ 0.817 (1.101)
while a highly educated worker does so at a rate f(h) ¼ 1.219 (1.236). Thus, with equal
contact rates, the job finding rate is 50% higher for the latter type of workers whereas it
is only 12% higher if OTJ search is ignored. Given a job destruction rate of 10% this
leads to a 3.3 percentage point higher unemployment rate for less educated workers
when k ¼ 1, as opposed to only 0.8 percentage points when k ¼ 0. Thus, OTJ search
leads to predictions about the differential in unemployment rates by educational
attainment that are more consistent with the available evidence in most OECD
countries.
The second difference worth stressing is that the share of mismatched workers
among the highly educated ones is much lower with k ¼ 1 (0.124 ¼ 0.031/0.25) than
with k ¼ 0 (0.824 ¼ 0.206/0.25). This again adds further realism to our model.
Interestingly, when k ¼ 1, JTJ transitions account for almost for 35% of all separations
by highly educated workers, i.e., a proportion which is in line with those reported in
Section 1.11
Finally, to quantify the effect of these JTJ transitions on wage dispersion, we report
four useful statistics. As a proxy for the degree of between group wage inequality, we
compute the ratio between the average wage of highly educated workers and the wage
of less educated workers. Likewise, the within education wage inequality is measured by
the ratio between the average wage of highly educated workers and their wage in
unskilled jobs. Finally, to control for the relative size of the two groups, we also com
pute the total variance of the wage distribution which is further decomposed into a
permanent component due to between group wage differences and a transitory com
ponent due to within group wage differences. These statistics are reported in the lower
panels of Table 1. They show that our benchmark model with k ¼ 1 yields considerably
higher wage dispersion than the alternative model without OTJ search. In the latter
case, the skill premium is less than 7% while the former generates 37.8%. Even more
striking is the difference in the degree of within group wage inequality. Since mis
matched workers earn less than less educated workers, our model can easily explain a
gap of 60% between the mean and the lowest wage of highly educated workers, while
this gap is reduced to 2% with k ¼ 0. A similar picture emerges when we look at the
overall variance of the wage distribution which is about fifteen times larger when k ¼ 1,
and a substantial part of this additional variance can be attributed to the wage dis
persion among highly educated workers.
6.2. Comparative Statics
Our next objective is to gauge how important JTJ transitions are in affecting the
response of the labour market to shifts in the relative productivity of skilled jobs. To
simulate the effects of SBTC, we raise the value of y(s) from its benchmark value of 1.5
11 The proportion of JTJ transitions in total separations of highly-educated workers is computed as the
ratio between the flow of JTJ transitions in any small time interval dt [f(h)(1 f)e(n, h)]dt and the total flow
of separations by this type of workers in the same time interval [f(h)(1 f)e(n, h) þ d(1 l u(h)] dt.
Inserting into this ratio the outcomes reported in the first column of Table 1, yields a value of 0.35.
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to a value of 2. The results are summarised in the first two columns of Table 2 which,
for brevity, reports the values of a subset of key variables which include the labour
market tightness, the unemployment rates of both types of workers, the share of highly
educated job seekers, and two measures of wage dispersion.
In our benchmark economy with equal contact rates (column 1) the increase in
y(s) leads to a fall of 0.6 p.p. in the unemployment rate of highly educated workers,
~uðhÞ and a rise of 0.3 p.p. in the unemployment rate of less educated workers, ~uðlÞ.
Thus, the changes in both unemployment rates are small relative to the changes in
productivity. By contrast, the share of highly educated job seekers drops by as much
as 6 p.p. while the degree of between and within group wage inequality increase by,
34.5% and 39.4%, respectively. Hence, the bulk of the adjustment takes place via a
change in wages and an increase in the share of skilled jobs. Much more striking
results are obtained when k ¼ 0. In this case the strong increase in the outside option
of highly educated workers, U(h), induces a shift to an equilibrium with ex post
segmentation. As a result, the unemployment rates for highly and less educated
workers jump up by 6.9 and 3.6 p.p., respectively.12 This drastic response to SBTC
contrasts with the gradual changes experienced by the unemployment rates when
OTJ search is accounted for.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 2 report similar results for the case of SU,
which is captured by an increase in the share of highly educated workers, 1 l, from
25% to 50%. Again we have chosen a parameter configuration such that the new
equilibrium with k ¼ 0 exhibits ex post segmentation. When comparing the results
with those in Table 1, we find a growing gap between the unemployment rates for the
two groups of workers alongside a widening of the between and within group wage
inequality. The only qualitative difference with the case of SBTC is in the evolution of
the share of highly educated job seekers. While SBTC led to a reduction in this share,
Table 2
Comparative Statics
Variables
SBTC SU*
OTJ W/o OTJ OTJ W/o OTJ
Labour market tightness h 1.762 1.786 1.657 1.672
Share of highly-educated job
seekers 1 /w
0.321 0.287 0.494 0.208
Unemployment rate
highly-educated workers ~uðhÞ
0.070 0.144 0.072 0.120
Unemployment rate
less-educated workers ~uðlÞ
0.112 0.119 0.136 0.152
JTJ/total separations 0.335 0 0.300 0
Wage inequality
Between groups 1.854 1.944 1.484 1.534
Within groups 2.317 0 1.923 0
* The reported figures correspond to the unique equilibrium with ex post segmentation.
12 Under cross-skill matching the effects are less dramatic. In this case, SBTC produces at most a 1.3 p.p.
increase in the unemployment rate of the less-educated workers, while the unemployment rate of the highly-
educated workers is unaffected by the rise in y(s).
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we now observe a strong increase, from 38% to 49%. Finally, it is worthwhile stressing
that the increase in the fraction of highly educated workers gives rise to a small
reduction in the unemployment rate of this group. Thus, as anticipated in Section 5,
our model exhibits cohort size effects. The intuition for these effects is that the JTJ
flows make labour demand so responsive to supply shifts that highly educated workers
face a lower risk of unemployment as they become more abundant in the popula
tion.13
6.3. Unequal Contact Rates
The two limiting cases analysed above are useful for analytical purposes but a realistic
value of k probably lies somewhere in between of 0 and 1 (Christensen et al., 2005).
To analyse this case we compute the labour market outcomes for a range of k that
goes from 0.2 to our benchmark value of 1. Our main findings (available at http://
www.res.org.uk) are that the unemployment rates show little variation over this range
relative to the rates displayed in Table 1 with k ¼ 1. The bulk of the adjustment takes
place through a shift in the composition of employment and the pool of job seekers.
In particular, since mismatched workers move quicker to skilled jobs at higher values
for k, we obtain a gradual monotonic reduction in the share of highly educated job
seekers together with a rise in the share of separations of highly educated workers
that are due to JTJ transitions. For example, at k ¼ 0.2 this last share is equal to 0.22,
compared to 0.35 in the benchmark model with k ¼ 1. Furthermore, as k increases,
there is a strong rise in the degree of wage inequality, both between groups and
within the cohort of highly educated workers. The evolution of the wage of
mismatched workers, w(n, h), is key for this result. At the starting value of k ¼ 0.2,
this wage exceeds the value of w(n, l ) as in AV, but w(n, h) falls steeply with k and
beyond a threshold of k ¼ 0.42, we find that w(n, h) < w(n, l ) (see Figure 4). Hence,
our numerical example illustrates that the result obtained in Proposition 5 still holds
for positive values of k below unity.
6.4. Europe vs. US
As discussed in Section 1, JTJ transitions explain roughly a similar share (between 40%
and 50%) of the separations in the EU and the US. Further, two other well known
stylised facts are that while the unemployment rate is higher in Europe, wage inequality
is higher in the US.
In this last Section, we explore how our parameter choice in the benchmark model
could be modified to account simultaneously for these three stylised facts. To capture
the lower unemployment and higher wage inequality in the US, we assume that the US
labour market has a higher matching efficiency than the European one, so that its
meeting function changes from h
p
to z h
p
with z > 1. In our model, this change would
lead to lower unemployment rates for both types of workers and a rise in wage
inequality, replicating the evidence for the US. However, a logical consequence of this
13 Shimer (2001) uses a similar argument to explain the fall in the unemployment rate of young workers
when the baby-boom generation entered the US labour market.
  21
higher matching efficiency would be a fall in the share of mismatched workers which
would reduce the proportion of the total separations of highly educated workers that
JTJ flows represents. Hence we need to consider an additional parameter change to
capture the similarity of these shares. One plausible assumption is that the higher
flexibility of the US labour market also results in a larger value for k than in Europe.
From our previous simulations we know that a rise in k leads to more quits and more
wage inequality, without a drastic change in the unemployment rates. Thus, we should
be able to account for all the stylised facts by assuming higher values of k and z in the
US than in Europe.
Table 3 presents an example in which we compare the labour market outcomes for
an economy with z ¼ 1.25 and k ¼ 1 (US) and another where z ¼ 1 and k ¼ 0.5 (EU).
Inspection of the results shows that the first economy generates more wage inequality
and lower unemployment rates while the ratio between the JTJ transitions and the total
flow of separations of the highly educated workers is almost identical (31%) in both
economies.
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w(n, h)
w(s, h)
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Fig. 4. The Equilibrium Wages with Unequal Contact Rates
Table 3
The US vs. Europe
Variables
Economy I (EU) Economy II (US)
f ðhÞ ¼ hp & k ¼ 0:5 f ðhÞ ¼ 1:25 hp & k ¼ 1
Labour market tightness h 1.511 1.570
Share of highly-educated job seekers 1 /w 0.462 0.377
Unemployment rate highly-educated workers ~uðhÞ 0.075 0.060
Unemployment rate less-educated workers ~uðlÞ 0.108 0.088
JTJ/total separations 0.309 0.308
Wage Inequality
Between groups 1.342 1.400
Within groups 1.377 1.716
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7. Conclusions
OTJ search by over qualified workers is a prominent feature in labour markets. In this
article we analyse how this phenomenon affects the structure of employment and wages
in an economy where highly and less educated workers compete for unskilled jobs.
From a policy perspective, two results stand out. First, transitory mismatch is more
harmful for the labour market position of less educated workers than permanent
mismatch. It induces a shift in the job distribution towards skilled jobs and it lowers the
overall stability of unskilled jobs. At the same time, however, we show that it also
reduces the sensitivity of the profits in unskilled jobs to changes in the upper segment
of the labour market. As a result, shifts in the demand and supply of higher skills have a
milder impact on the unemployment rate of the less educated workers than what is
predicted by models where OTJ search is ignored.
Our analysis focuses on a single motive for JTJ transitions, namely the pursuit of a
better match. A logical extension would be to consider alternative wage setting
mechanisms that allow for wage dispersion among identical workers in the same type of
job. This extension would make JTJ transitions more frequent since workers may try to
use OTJ search to obtain a pay rise. However, this extension will not affect the main
conclusions reached here qualitatively, except those on wage dispersion.
A more challenging extension would be to explore the efficiency properties of the
JTJ transitions. The mobility decisions of workers are based on a comparison between
actual and future wages. There is clearly no reason why these decisions should be
efficient because the workers ignore both the negative effects on their incumbent
employers and the positive effect on future employers. In addition, the employed job
seekers congest the market for unemployed job seekers and their higher quit rate
discourages the creation of unskilled jobs. Since a utilitarian social planner would take
all these effects into account, it would be interesting to analyse the conditions under
which the planner prefers more or less frequent JTJ transitions than in the decentra
lised economy.
Another avenue for future research would be to analyse the response of the economy
to aggregate productivity shocks. In an economy with costly OTJ search this could give
rise to pro cyclical fluctuations in the intensity of OTJ search as mismatched workers
search more intensively during booms. An interesting aspect of such an economy is that
the overall match quality changes over the cycle. From the viewpoint of less educated
workers, a recession is therefore a period of low job creation and intense competition
with highly educated workers, while booms are periods of high job creation and a
gradual release of jobs that were previously occupied by highly educated workers.
Finally, as argued in the Introduction, Hornstein et al. (2006) have documented that
actual residual wage inequality in the US is twenty times larger than the one predicted
by a large class of search and matching models. They also claim that the introduction of
OTJ search only leads to a modest improvement. Our results seem to suggest that this
conclusion could be driven by the fact that Hornstein et al. only consider OTJ search
within narrowly defined markets. However, as shown in this article, highly educated
workers are typically willing to accept a wide range of jobs. It would therefore be
interesting to analyse whether the introduction of OTJ search and mismatch can
improve the empirical performance of calibrated search and matching models.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider an equilibrium in which firms offer exclusively unskilled jobs (f 1). Then, the asset
value of vacancies would be given by:
rV ðnÞ c þ pðhÞð1 bÞ yðnÞ rU
r þ d 0; ðA:1Þ
where
rU b þ f ðhÞb yðnÞ rU
r þ d
 
ðA:2Þ
is the identical outside option value of both types of workers. Let h denote the unique value of
the labour market tightness that solves (A.1) given (A.2). To rule out an equilibrium of this type,
it must hold that:
rV ðsÞ c þ pðhÞð1 bÞð1 lÞ yðsÞ rU
r þ d > 0; ðA:3Þ
namely, a deviant firm can make positive profits by opening a skilled job. Comparing (A.1) and
(A.3), it follows that this condition leads to the requirement that:
ð1 lÞ½yðsÞ rU  > yðnÞ rU : ðA:4Þ
Finally, solving for rU in (A.2) and replacing it into (A.4), yields (31).
Proof of Proposition 2
In a cross skill matching equilibrium, all three possible types of matches need to generate a
positive surplus. First, to show that S(n, l ) > 0 and S(s, h) > 0, we proceed as follows. First,
substituting (20) into the right hand side of (12) yields:
Sðn; lÞ yðnÞ b
r þ dþ f ðhÞfb ; ðA:5Þ
while the solution for S(s, h) is obtained by substituting (21) into (14)
Sðs; hÞ a1½yðsÞ b þ f ðhÞbf½yðsÞ yðnÞ
a2a3 þ ðr þ dÞf ðhÞbfð1 kÞ ; ðA:6Þ
where both surplus expressions are positive because b < y(n) < y(s).
Next, the expression for S(n, h) can be obtained from (16) by using (14) and replacing S(s, h)
by (A.6). After some algebraic manipulation, it becomes:
Sðn; hÞ a3½yðnÞ b f ðhÞbð1 fÞð1 kÞ½yðsÞ b
a2a3 þ ðr þ dÞf ðhÞbfð1 kÞ : ðA:7Þ
The proof is completed by noticing that condition (32) is equivalent to S(n, h)  0, namely,
a3[y(n) b]  f(h)b(1 f)(1 k)[y(s) b].
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider an economy with a unique ex post segmentation equilibrium for k 0, and let (he,fe)
denote the associated equilibrium values for h and f. In this economy, the expected asset value of
an unemployed highly educated worker is:
rU ðhÞ b þ f ðheÞð1 feÞbSðs; hÞ; ðA:8Þ
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where S(s, h) [y(s) b]/[r þ d þ f(he)(1 fe)b]. Since, highly educatedworkers refuse towork
in unskilled jobs in this case, it must be that S(n, h) < 0, which, in turn, requires that rU(h) > y(n).
Now consider the same economy but with k > 0. In this case, we can derive the minimum wage
at which a highly educated worker would be willing to accept an unskilled job. Denote this wage
by w. If w < y(n), then a highly educated worker and a firm with an unskilled job can both obtain
a gain if they accept to match and fix some wage w 2 (w, y(n)). In such a case, the equilibrium
with ex post segmentation would cease to exist. Below we show that there always exists some value
of k < 1 for which this is the case.
Formally, let Wn(w) denote the lifetime income of a deviant highly educated worker who
accepts an arbitrary wage w to work in an unskilled job. Since mismatched workers will quit when
they find a skilled job, the asset value equation for Wn(w) satisfies:
rWnðwÞ w þ d½U ðhÞ WnðwÞ þ kf ðheÞð1 feÞbSðs; hÞ; ðA:9Þ
which is strictly increasing in w. Combining (A.8) and (A.9), we find that:
WnðwÞ U ðhÞ w b f ðh
eÞð1 kÞð1 feÞbSðs; hÞ
r þ d : ðA:10Þ
Likewise, the asset value of a firm with an unskilled job that offers a highly educated worker a
wage w satisfies:
JnðwÞ yðnÞ w
r þ dþ kf ðheÞð1 feÞ : ðA:11Þ
Now, we can define w implicitly by the following condition:
WnðwÞ U ðhÞ: ðA:12Þ
From (A.10) it follows that the solution is given by:
w b þ f ðheÞð1 kÞð1 feÞbSðs; hÞ; ðA:13Þ
that is, firms need to pay highly educated workers at least their opportunity cost. Moreover, 44
implies that a firm with an unskilled job would be willing to offer this minimum acceptable wage as
long as y(n) w  0. Notice that for k 0, w rU(h) and Jn(w) < 0 while for k 1, w b and
Jn(w) > 0. In other words, if workers cannot perform OTJ search, the equilibrium with ex post
segmentation is well defined because a firm with an unskilled job would make negative profits if it
were to pay a highly educated worker her opportunity cost w rU(h). On the contrary, when k
1, a mismatched worker and an unemployed job seeker have the same chances to match with a
skilled job. Thus, the worker will be willing to accept this job provided that w  b. Since y(s) > b, a
firm with an unskilled job can therefore make a highly educated worker an offer w 2 (b, y(n)) such
that the worker and the firm are strictly better off when they deviate.
From here, it follows that, for any pair (he, fe) 2 (0, 1)  (0, 1), there exists a k 2 ð0; 1Þ such
that Jn(w) > 0 for any k > k. For given values of h and f, the right hand side of (A.13) defines w as
a continuously decreasing function of k that maps [0,1] onto [b, rU(h)]. Thus, since
b < y(n) < rU(h), there exists a unique value k 2 (0,1), denoted by k, such that y(n) w 0
while Jn(w) > 0 for all k > k.
Proof of Proposition 4
Once more w rU(h) for k 0 holds but this time we have that rU(h) < y(n) because the
equilibrium exhibits cross skill matching. Thus, since w is decreasing in k, it must be that
y(n) w > 0 for any k > 0. Consequently, in this case, a highly educated worker and a firm with
an unskilled job incur a loss if they deviate from the equilibrium.
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Proof of Lemma 1
The surplus expressions for the general case of k 2 [0,1] are provided in (22). For k 1, these
expressions satisfy the following condition:
Sðn; hÞ yðnÞ b
r þ dþ f ðhÞ½1 fþ bf 
yðnÞ b
r þ dþ f ðhÞbf Sðn; lÞ; ðA:14Þ
with a strict inequality when f < 1. Notice that the assumption y(n) > b ensures that both S(n, h)
and S(n, l ) are strictly positive for finite values of h.
Proof of Proposition 5
The second inequality follows from the assumption that y(s) > y(n), so that U(h) > U(l ) when
f < 1. Since w(s, h) rU(h) þ b[y(s) rU(h)] and w(n, l ) rU(l ) þ b[y(n) b] this implies
that w(s, h) > w(n, l ). To obtain the first inequality, we insert (19) into (17). Hence:
wðn; hÞ b þ b½yðnÞ b þ f ðhÞbð1 bÞfSðn; hÞ:
Similarly, after replacing U(l ) in (13) by (18), we can rewrite the expression for w(n, l ) as:
wðn; lÞ b þ b½yðnÞ b þ f ðhÞbð1 bÞfSðn; lÞ
From the above expressions, it holds that:
wðn; hÞ wðn; lÞ f ðhÞbð1 bÞf½Sðn; hÞ Sðn; lÞ < 0
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 1.
Appendix B
Uniqueness
To prove uniqueness it is convenient to rewrite the equilibrium conditions in the following way.
First, we solve (24) and (25) for u and f in terms of h and /, yielding:
uðh;/Þ d
dþ f ðhÞ
1 l
1 /
; ðA:15Þ
fðh;/Þ ð1 /Þf ðhÞlþ dðl /Þ
f ðhÞ/ð1 lÞ : ðA:16Þ
Inspection of (A.16) shows that of(Æ)/o/ < 0 and of(Æ)/oh > 0 (as / > l). Next, our definition
of w implies that w/(1 w) u/e(n, h). Thus, combining (26) and (A.16) allows us to express w
in terms of h and /, namely:
wðh;/Þ dþ f ðhÞ½1 fðh;/Þ
dþ f ðhÞ½1 fðh;/Þ þ f ðhÞfðh;/Þð1 /Þ ðA:17Þ
with ow(Æ)/oh < 0 and ow(Æ)/o/ > 0. The next step is to substitute (A.16) and (A.17) into the
two free entry conditions (22) and (23). Evaluating the resulting expressions at k 1, this yields
the following system of two equations in two unknowns (h and /):
pðhÞwðh;/Þ /
r þ dþ f ðhÞfðh;/Þbþ
ð1 /Þ
a2
 
c
ð1 bÞ½yðnÞ b ; ðA:18Þ
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pðhÞ½1 wðh;/Þ/
a3
R
f ðhÞbfðh;/Þ
a2
 
c
ð1 bÞ½yðnÞ b ; ðA:19Þ
where R [y(s) b]/[y(n) b] > 1.
In implicit formwe shall refer to (A.18) and (A.19) asVN(h,/) 0 andVS(h,/) 0, respectively.
Our aim is to show that these two loci intersect at most once under the following set of conditions:
(1) There is a sufficiently large majority of less educated workers, so l  0.5 (2) Workers obtain at
least one half of the surplus and so b  0.5 and (3) R is sufficiently large. The first condition is
needed to guarantee that the composition effects are small so that o[p(h)(1 w/)]/oh
< 0 while o[f(h)(1 f)]oh > 0 which, in turn, imply that oa2/oh and oa3/oh are both positive.
Skilled jobs. To show that the locus associated with VS(h, /) 0 has a negative slope, we need to
prove that:
d/
dh

VS 0
@VS=@h
@VS=@/
< 0:
First, notice that the numerator can be written as follows:
@VS
@h
1
a3
R
bff ðhÞ
a2
 
@½pðhÞð1 w/Þ
@h
pðhÞð1 w/Þ
ða3Þ2
R
bff ðhÞ
a2
 
@a3
@h
pðhÞð1 w/Þ
a2a3
r þ d
a2
 
bf
@f ðhÞ
@h
pðhÞð1 w/Þ
a3
bf ðhÞ @
@f
f
a2
 
@f
@h
:
Given our assumptions, all four terms are negative. Thus, oVS/oh < 0.
Next, the expression for the partial derivative oVS/o/ is given by:
@VS
@/
pðhÞ
a3
R
bff ðhÞ
a2
 
wþ / @w
@/
 
þ pðhÞð1 /wÞða3Þ2
R
bff ðhÞ
a2
a3
ða2Þ2
½r þ dþ f ðhÞ
( )
f ðhÞb @f
@/
:
In principle, the sign of this expression is ambiguous since the last term between brackets
contains a positive and two negative terms. Nonetheless, using the feature that a2 a3 > 0, one
can show that oVS/o/ is unambiguously negative when the term
R
r þ dþ f ðhÞð1þ bfÞ
r þ dþ f ðhÞð1 fþ bfÞ ;
is positive. This sufficient condition requires that R is sufficiently larger than 1 which is
guaranteed by condition (3). Thus, since oVS/o/ and oVS/oh are both negative, the curve VS 0
has a negative slope.
Unskilled jobs. To show that the VN(h, /) 0 locus has a positive slope, it is sufficient to show
that:
d/
dh

VN 0
@VN =@h
@VN =@/
> 0:
The numerator of this expression is given by:
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@VN
@h
/
r þ dþ f ðhÞfbþ
1 /
a2
 
w
@½pðhÞ
@h
þ pðhÞ @w
@h
 	
pðhÞw b/
r þ dþ f ðhÞfb½ 2
( )
f
@f ðhÞ
@h
þ f ðhÞ @f
@h
 
pðhÞw ð1 /Þða2Þ2
ð1 fþ bfÞ @f ðhÞ
@h
ð1 bÞf ðhÞ @f
@h
 
:
In equilibrium / > 1 / because / > l and l  0.5. Moreover, a2 > r þ d þ f(h)fb and, by
condition (2), b  0.5. Using these results, it can be easily shown that the above expression has a
negative sign. Hence, oVN/oh < 0.
Finally, the derivative oVN/o/ is given by:
@VN
@/
pðhÞ /
r þ dþ f ðhÞfbþ
1 /
a2
 
@w
@/
þ pðhÞw 1
r þ dþ f ðhÞfb
1
a2
 
pðhÞw /bf ðhÞ
r þ dþ f ðhÞfb½ 2
@f
@/
þ pðhÞw ð1 /Þ
a2ð Þ2
f ðhÞð1 bÞ @f
@/
:
The first three terms of this expression are positive, while the fourth term is negative. None
theless, since b  0.5, / > 1 / and a2 > r þ d þ f(h)fb the last term is smaller in absolute
value than the third term. Hence, the overall expression for oVN/o/ is positive. The latter implies
that the locus VN 0 is upward sloping, since oVN/oh < 0. Consequently, the two free entry loci
can intersect at most once.
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